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Abstract
We argue that incentives to take equity risk (“equity incentives”) only partially cap-
ture incentives to take asset risk (“asset incentives”). This is because leverage, while
central to the theory of risk-shifting, is not explicitly considered by equity incentives.
Employing measures of asset incentives that account for leverage, we find that asset
risk-taking incentives can be large compared to incentives to increase firm value. More-
over, stock holdings can induce substantial risk-taking incentives, qualifying common
beliefs regarding the central role of stock options. Finally, asset incentives help explain
asset risk-taking of U.S. financial institutions before the 2007/08 crisis.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates managerial incentives to take asset risk. A significant theoretical literature
deals with these incentives, offering the central insight that managerial compensation structures
should“...take into account not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management,
but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships ...” (John and
John, 1993, p. 950). Besides the manager-shareholder conflict, perhaps the most important con-
flict arising in the corporate “nexus of contracts” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is the shareholder-
bondholder conflict regarding “asset substitution.” While shareholders want to align managerial
interests with their own and also to shift risk to bondholders to some extent, they consider that
asset risk-taking incentives optimally avoid excessive (firm value-reducing) agency costs of debt.
Although these ideas have long been theoretically established,1 little is known empirically about
managerial incentives to take asset risk embedded in observed compensation contracts. This is
surprising, given the great relevance of these incentives in corporate finance research (in particular,
for work aiming to explain asset risk-taking by firms) and discussions in practice. This paper
aims to make progress on this issue by addressing two questions: First, how powerful are a typical
manager’s incentives to take asset risk and to increase firm value? Second, can asset risk-taking
incentives add to our understanding of the cross-sectional variation of asset risk-taking?
Section 2 deals with the first question. We consider a CEO who receives stock and/or stock
options, the two most direct means of aligning shareholder and managerial interests. To understand
the embedded incentives to take asset risk, we not only model equity itself as an option on the firm’s
assets (Merton, 1974), but, to be consistent, we also treat stock options as compound options on the
underlying asset value (Geske, 1979). This combined approach is novel to the incentives literature.
In this framework, we calculate the following measures: Asset Volatility Vega is the dollar change
of the value of a stock or stock option with respect to a 0.01 change in the asset return volatility,
and Asset Delta is the dollar change of the value of a stock or stock option with respect to a one
1Other theoretical papers studying how optimal incentives navigate the two conflicts include, for example, Haugen
and Senbet (1981) and John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000).
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percent change in the firm value.2 These two quantities capture asset incentives. We choose this
terminology to emphasize that although the manager receives pay whose value depends on equity
values, our measure captures his implied incentives to influence asset values and asset risk.
By contrast, Equity Volatility Vega measures the incentives of the CEO to increase stock return
volatility. Equity Delta measures the incentives to increase the stock price. These two quantities,
usually calculated as in Core and Guay (2002), have been widely used in the empirical literature
on risk-taking and incentives. They form the equity incentives.
The key difference between asset incentives and equity incentives is that the level of debt enters
explicitly only in the calculations of asset incentives. To intuitively see why this is important when
comparing, across CEOs, incentives to take asset risk, note that the additional asset risk-taking that
causes a 0.01 change in equity return volatility depends on leverage. This reflects the idea from the
theory of asset substitution that managerial asset risk-taking incentives change as leverage changes.
However, leverage does not feature explicitly in the calculation of equity incentives; therefore, they
can indicate asset incentives, but the cross section of equity incentives only partially captures
the cross section of asset incentives. More formally, for a given CEO, asset volatility and equity
volatility are linked through the elasticity of the equity value with respect to the asset value, and
this elasticity varies (non-linearly) across firms as leverage varies. In the cross section of CEOs,
asset incentives are, therefore, not simply a uniformly scaled version of equity incentives.
To develop this intuition and to explore the quantitative importance of the difference between
the incentive measures in practice, we then consider a CEO receiving a compensation package of a
given value, consisting of different combinations of stock and stock options. For an interpretation of
the overall incentives to take asset risk embedded in a compensation package, we note that because
the manager is risk-averse, higher exposure to firm value movements (due to a higher Asset Delta)
makes the manager less willing to take asset risk. A meaningful measure of overall managerial asset
substitution incentives is, therefore, given by the Asset Incentive Ratio, the ratio of total Asset
Volatility Vega and total Asset Delta. Similarly, the Equity Incentive Ratio is the ratio of total
2One auxiliary contribution of this paper is that we provide a correct formula for the sensitivity of a compound
option to the volatility of the underlying (departing from the formula presented in Geske (1979)).
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Equity Volatility Vega and total Equity Delta. (In the empirical analysis, we consider these ratios,
but we also always report results for the underlying two measures, vega and delta, separately.)
This basic analysis yields four results. First, the Asset Incentive Ratio suggests significant
asset risk-taking incentives even when a CEO is compensated only with stock. Second, for all
combinations of stock and stock options, the Asset Incentive Ratio is significantly higher than
the Equity Incentive Ratio. Third, as expected, the difference between the Asset Incentive Ratio
and the Equity Incentive Ratio is greater when leverage is higher; however, even at 40% leverage
(the average leverage of a BBB-rated firm) the differences can be substantial. Fourth, the higher
leverage is, the less stock options add in terms of asset risk-taking incentives (compared to equity
risk-taking-incentives); intuitively, at high leverage, stock itself has such strong optionality that
even a CEO holding only stock already has strong incentives to take asset risk, and the marginal
contribution of stock options is, in fact, small.
In view of the important role that leverage plays for incentives, we then explore the relevance of
asset risk-taking incentives in a sample of U.S. financial institutions. We are particularly interested
in the years before the 2007/08 financial crisis.
Here, too, we document several notable facts, which confirm in the data what the previous
analysis had suggested for a hypothetical CEO. First, for many CEOs in the sample, incentives to
take asset risk emanating from stock-holdings are substantial. In some contrast, relying on results
from Guay (1999) for an average of firms over a range of industries, the existing literature argues
that the incentives, due to stock holdings, to take equity risk are negligible. By setting Equity
Volatility Vega from stock to zero, the literature effectively assumes that risk-taking incentives are
due only to stock options. Practitioners also tend to perceive stock options as the main driver of
risk-taking behavior by CEOs. Our theoretical and empirical findings qualify this view, and they
have both practical implications for boards of directors designing managerial compensation systems
and for academics conducting research on risk-taking. From a policy perspective, even if regulation
is put in place that reduces financial leverage of financial institutions somewhat, the results imply
that even straightforward equity plans entail significant asset risk-taking incentives.
Second, a puzzling fact in much of the literature is that the observed Equity Incentive Ratio
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is often fairly small – perhaps too small to offer an economic justification for a CEO to engage in
significant risk-taking. For asset incentives, we obtain quite different results. In our sample, for
the main parameter choice, the Asset Incentive Ratio is, at the mean, about 0.50, around 30-50%
larger than the Equity Incentive Ratio. For other reasonable parameter values, this difference can
be much larger.
Third, the correlation between the Asset Incentive Ratio and the Equity Incentive Ratio is on
average only about 0.40 in our sample, even controlling for leverage. Thus, incorporating cross-
sectional variation in leverage into the calculation of incentives and recognizing that risk-taking
incentives emanate also from stocks indeed yields a new perspective on incentives.
Section 3 then documents the potential empirical importance of considering managerial asset
incentives when aiming to explain asset risk-taking, continuing to use the 2007/08 crisis as the
context. We consider various measures of risk-taking. We note that this crisis essentially exposed the
downside of the asset risk that banks undertook in prior years. As such, write-downs in 2007/08 form
a natural indication of the degree of asset risk-taking by financial institutions in years prior to the
crisis. Indeed, by and large, banks with higher Asset Incentive Ratios in the years 2003-06 had higher
write-downs (in absolute terms and scaled by total assets). Also, banks with stronger incentives
to take asset risk tended to derive a larger portion of their income from non-interest activities and
invested more in mortgage-backed securities and low-quality real estate. Moreover, the market
recognized a higher expected default frequency of financial institutions with higher Asset Incentive
Ratios, that is, these companies exhibited smaller distance to default. We seek to ameliorate
endogeneity concerns by using lagged incentives, by including firm fixed effects and other governance
features as controls, and by employing supplementary instrumental variable regressions. In sum,
asset incentives help explain variation in asset risk-taking by financial institutions. Interestingly,
the Equity Incentive Ratio does not provide much explanatory power in our regressions, consistent
with the intuition that to explain asset risk-taking it is important to use asset incentives.
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, the general literature on managerial
compensation schemes and their consequences, which is too large to review in detail (see Edmans,
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Gabaix, and Jenter (2017) for a survey), mostly deals with incentives of the CEO to increase the
share price and to take equity risk (see, for example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), Guay (1999)
and Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002)). The main contribution of this paper is to introduce and
shed light on the relevance of managerial incentives to take asset risk and increase the firm value.
The notion that such asset risk taking incentives emanate also from straight equity ownership does
not contradict or make less relevant the idea that stock options can provide risk-taking incentives.
For example, Shue and Townsend (2017) provide evidence of a causal effect of options on risk-
taking. Our paper cautions, however, that an exclusive focus on stock options as the driver of
risk-taking incentives can be problematic. Asset substitution has been a central theme of corporate
finance since Jensen and Meckling (1976).3 Although several papers (e.g., Lewellen (2006)) study
the influence of leverage on CEO incentives, the explicit analysis of asset incentives of managers
has not received much attention.4
Second, this paper also makes a specific contribution to the financial crisis literature because
our approach and, consequently, our results differ from other papers.5 The related papers in this
literature can be organized in terms of the dependent variable (risk-taking before the crisis or
performance during the crisis) and the central explanatory variable (incentives or governance).
(i) Some papers consider governance and risk-taking : Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2015)
document a positive association between total compensation and risk-exposure of financial insti-
3Papers examining the importance of asset substitution in general tend to conclude that incentives to shift risks
are low for most firms, but increase with debt levels; see, for example, Parrino and Weisbach (1999) and Rauh (2008).
4One exception is Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005), who provide simulations of a structural model to
characterize the set of risky projects that a manager would undertake. They also find that at high leverage ratios
managers have risk-shifting incentives. Relative to this study, our contribution is to provide a formula for the
computation of asset incentives, a comparison with equity incentives, and an empirical analysis of the cross-section of
these incentives and their explanatory power for actual risk-taking choices of financial institutions. We recently became
aware of an independent paper in the accounting literature (Anderson and Core, 2018), which also studies incentives
to increase firm volatility. While our papers share the basic idea that risk-taking incentives are also embedded in
equity, there are conceptual differences between our studies. We model stock options as compound options, whereas
Anderson and Core (2018) consider them as warrants, and in our framework the company still has debt when the
stock option is exercised (an assumption we regard as realistic particularly for financial institutions), whereas in their
setting the company is debt-free at that point. We discuss these differences in more detail in Section 2.2.
5For studies on risk-taking and governance in banks generally see, for example, Laeven and Levine (2009) and
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990). Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova, Prabhala, and Senbet (2010) survey some of the
financial crisis literature. Theoretical models of optimal incentive design and regulation of pay especially in financially
institutions are contained in, for example, see John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000), John, Mehran, and Qian (2010),
Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), and Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2015).
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tutions; other work focuses on corporate governance and specific measures of risk-taking, such as
risky mortgage-backed securities involvement (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). (ii) Adams (2012) con-
siders the quality of governance and performance in U.S. banks, while Erkens, Hung, and Matos
(2012) offer evidence from a global sample. (They also provide results regarding risk-taking.) (iii)
Regarding incentives and performance, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that banks whose CEOs
had incentives better aligned with those of the other shareholders did not perform better during
the crisis. Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2014) conclude that CEO incentives were unrelated to bank
holdings of “toxic”mortgage-backed securities. By some contrast, Suntheim (2011) finds that banks
which endowed their CEO with high risk taking incentives had worse accounting performance in
the period after the Lehman collapse, and Kolasinski and Yang (2018) provide evidence that short-
termist incentives explained lower stock returns during the crisis, higher subprime exposure, and
higher probability of financial distress.
(iv) The focus of our paper is the relationship between incentives and risk-taking. Boyallian
and Ruiz-Verdu´ (2018) show that highly levered banks where executives had high equity Delta were
more likely to fail during the crisis. As they note, that reduced form approach and our explicit
asset incentives valuation approach are complementary. Bhagat and Bolton (2014) look at the
net payoffs obtained by the CEOs of 14 institutions and conclude that the compensation packages
induced excessive risk-taking incentives. Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) document that CEOs
with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Gande and Kalpathy (2017) find
that the extent to which the largest US financial institutions received emergency loans in the crisis
is increasing in pre-crisis Equity Volatility Vega. DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2013) provide a rich
set of evidence. Regarding asset risk-taking, they find that both Equity Volatility Vega and Equity
Delta were positively associated with investments in MBS securities in the years before the crisis.
As they note, this finding is puzzling. Theoretical considerations and previous empirical evidence
suggest that Vega and Delta should be associated with risk-taking with opposite signs (e.g., Knopf,
Nam, and Thornton (2002)). Our analysis provides empirical support for this idea in the context
of the 2007/08 financial crisis. In sum, we advance this literature by studying asset risk-taking
incentives and their power to explain asset risk-taking.
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2 Managerial Asset Incentives
We consider a CEO who receives equity-based compensation, consisting of stock and/or stock
options. To measure managerial incentives to take asset risks, we appeal to the idea, dating back
to Merton (1974), that equity can be viewed as a contingent claim on the firm value. Using
this framework, we calculate asset incentives, Asset Volatility Vega – capturing the incentives to
increase the standard deviation of firm value – and Asset Delta – capturing the incentives to increase
firm value. Guay (1999) also relies on the contingent claims idea to calculate, for a sample of firms
including both financial and non-financial companies, the Equity Volatility Vega of stock. However,
Guay (1999) then goes on to calculate Equity Volatility Vega from stock options in the usual way,
relying on the Black-Scholes formula, treating equity as the primitive, and then adds to this the
Equity Volatility Vega from stocks obtained by relevering his Asset Volatility Vega of stocks. We
instead consider stock options as compound options (Geske, 1979). The idea of considering stock
options as compound options on the firm value is new to the literature on risk-taking, but a natural
step in order to operate within a coherent framework.
Subsection 2.1 sets up the model framework. Subsection 2.2 derives Asset Delta and Asset
Volatility Vega. Subsection 2.3 introduces Equity Delta and Equity Volatility Vega. Subsection 2.4
explains the differences of asset incentives and equity incentives for the case of a single stock or
stock option. Subsection 2.5 investigates the incentives emanating from a portfolio of stocks and
stock options. Subsection 2.6 provides a quantitative analysis of managerial incentives to take asset
risk in a cross section of financial institutions.
2.1 Model
We follow Merton (1974) and assume the firm value, V , follows a geometric Brownian motion
dVt
Vt
= µV dt+ σV dWt (1)
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where {Wt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion under the historical measure. The parameters µV
and σV are assumed constant. We also assume that there exists a bank account which yields a
constant interest rate r. Debt, D, is assumed to be at the long-term expected value. Considering
equity as a call option on the firm value, stock can be valued according to the Black-Scholes
formula6,
BS0 := S0 = V0N(d1)−De−rTDN(d2) (2)
where d1 =
ln(V0/D)+(r+σ2V /2)TD
σV
√
TD
and d2 = d1 − σV
√
TD.
Next, we recognize that stock options can be viewed as compound options on the underlying
firm value V . This idea is novel to the executive incentives literature. Geske (1979) shows that the
price of a compound call (CC) option is given by7
CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K) = V N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC/TD)
− De−rTDN2(h, k;
√
TCC/TD)−Ke−rTCCN1(h), (3)
where N2(·) represents the bivariate cumulative normal distribution function, N1(·) represents the
standard normal cumulative distribution function, TCC denotes the expiration of the stock option
and TD denotes the maturity of the debt.
8 The remaining terms are
h =
ln(V/V¯ ) + (r − 12σ2V )TCC
σV
√
TCC
, and k =
ln(V/D) + (r − 12σ2V )TD
σV
√
TD
(4)
and V¯ is the value of V which is the implicit solution to the equation
V N1(k¯(V ) + σV
√
TD − TCC)−De−r(TD−TCC)N1(k¯(V ))−K = 0, (5)
6We exclude dividends for simplicity. From option pricing theory there is no reason to expect that omitting this
component will result in substantially different outcomes.
7From here on, we omit the time subscripts for notational simplicity.
8Thus, the model requires that TD > TCC . We come back to the choice of appropriate debt and stock option
maturities in our application below.
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where
k¯(V ) =
ln(V/D) + (r − 12σ2V )(TD − TCC)
σV
√
TD − TCC
(6)
and where K denotes the strike price of the option and D denotes the face value of debt per share,
so that V¯ denotes the firm value where the option is just at the money at time TCC .
2.2 Asset Incentives
We now compute sensitivities of a single stock and a single stock option with respect to firm value
parameters. Asset Delta is the first derivative of the stock and stock option price, respectively, with
respect to a one percent change in the firm value, V . Asset Volatility Vega is the first derivative of
the stock and stock option price, respectively, with respect to a 0.01 change in the underlying asset
return volatility, σV .
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First, the sensitivity of a stock with respect to a change in firm value is
Asset Delta from stocks =
∂BS0(V,D, r, TD, σV )
∂V
· (V/100)
= N(d1(V,D, r, TD, σV )) · (V/100). (7)
Note that Asset Delta from stocks is not equal to one.
Second, by relying on the formula for a compound call option,
Asset Delta from stock options =
∂CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K)
∂V
· (V/100) (8)
= N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , k + σV
√
TD,
√
TCC/TD) · (V/100).
Note that the derivative of the compound formula with respect to the underlying asset value, V ,
converges to the Delta in the Black-Scholes model as the face value of debt equals zero.
Third, we compute the incentive, coming from the CEO’s stock holdings, to increase the firm
9We choose these definitions to be parallel with the standard definition of Equity Incentives. Of course, an increase
in asset volatility by 0.01 may imply, for highly levered firms, a quite large increase in equity volatility. Our primary
interest will be in the relative size of Asset Volatility Vega and Asset Delta.
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value return volatility. Relying on the Black-Scholes formula, we obtain
Asset Volatility Vega from stocks =
∂BS0(V,D, r, TD, σV )
∂σV
· (1/100),
= ϕ(d1(V,D, r, TD, σV ))V
√
TD · (1/100), (9)
where ϕ denotes the standard normal probability density.
Fourth, we turn to the incentive, coming from the CEO’s stock option holdings, to increase the
firm value return volatility. For this sensitivity, we derive the result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The Asset Volatility Vega of a stock option in the compound option pricing
model is given by
Asset Volatility Vega from stock options =
∂CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K)
∂σV
· (1/100) (10)
where
∂CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K)
∂σV
= V ϕ(h+ σV
√
TCC)
√
TCCN1
(
k¯(V¯ ) + σV
√
TD − TCC
)
+ De−rTDϕ(k)
√
TDN1

h−
√
TCC
TD
k√
1− TCCTD

 (11)
and the parameters are defined in Section I.A.
Proof See Appendix A.
Contrary to the result presented in Geske (1979), which is shown in Appendix A for complete-
ness, our formula for the derivative of the compound option value with respect to the asset return
volatility converges to the Black-Scholes Vega as the debt converges to zero. Indeed, this appears
to be the intuitive benchmark result. In the formula of Geske (1979), vega goes to zero for zero
debt. More importantly, even for non-zero debt there are often substantial differences in the magni-
tude of the calculated risk-taking incentives using both approaches. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
The figure considers a single stock option. We plot the Asset Volatility Vega using the formula
in Geske (1979) and the formula given in Proposition 1. Figure 1 also shows a discrete difference
10
approximation using the compound option pricing formula derived by Geske (1979).10 Notably,
this difference approximation agrees with our analytical formula for the Asset Volatility Vega given
in Proposition 1.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
For example, for the chosen parameters and a face value of debt of 85 (which implies leverage
of around 55%), a single compound call option on the stock is worth US$ 4.4. For this case,
Proposition 1 implies that the correct Asset Volatility Vega (from a single stock option) is around
US$ 0.86, whereas the equivalent Asset Volatility Vega based on the formula presented in Geske
(1979) would equal only US$ 0.06.
Naturally, at very high leverage levels, when the compound option is deep out of the money,
increases in the asset volatility induce small value changes in the option value, resulting in the same
hump-shape form of Asset Volatility Vega of a single stock option with respect to the debt level
that arises also for a stock option with respect to the stock option strike price. Asset Volatility
Vega of a single option is monotonically increasing in the underlying asset volatility; see Figure A-1
in the Appendix.
Next, we consider a portfolio of options. Consider a board that has given the CEO compensation
in the form of stock options of a given amount. (For example, compensation consultants may have
advised the board that this is the appropriate level of equity-based incentive compensation.) How
do asset incentives change depending on the financial leverage of the company? Figure 2 shows
that both the whole portfolio’s Asset Volatility Vega and the Asset Delta are increasing in leverage.
As leverage increases, an increasing number of options has to be given to the CEO in order to keep
the value of the options constant. This dominates the hump-shaped relationship between leverage
and Asset Volatility Vega found for a single stock option in Figure 1. Importantly, Figure 2 shows
that the relationship between leverage and Asset Volatility Vega differs from that between leverage
and Asset Delta.11
10That is, we approximate the derivative of the compound call option price with respect to σV with a first difference
of the compound option pricing formula with respect to σV . For this, we consider a sufficiently small change in σV
in order to approximate the true derivative with a high precision.
11Note that in the figure we are fixing debt volatility. This is used to infer equity volatility (as asset volatility is
11
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
It is worth contrasting our analysis with that in an independent paper, Anderson and Core
(2018), which also studies incentives to increase firm volatility. While we model stock options as
compound options following Geske (1979), they consider stock options as warrants, using the model
of Ab´ınzano and Navas (2013). They, therefore, focus on the dilution that may occur when an option
is exercised; in our approach, the option is either settled in cash or the company has sufficient shares
in its treasury to settle the option. A direct comparison of the resulting incentives is not possible:12
Anderson and Core (2018) choose a version of Ab´ınzano and Navas (2013) which requires the stock
option maturity to be longer than the debt maturity. That is, in that setting, at the time the stock
option is possibly exercised, the company is debt-free if it still exists. As Ab´ınzano and Navas
(2013) argue, p. 1203, this case is unlikely to apply in reality. By contrast, in the Geske (1979)
framework that we use, when the stock option is exercised, the company still has debt, that is, debt
maturity is longer than the stock option maturity. Especially for financial institutions, which are
the focus of our study of risk-taking before the financial crisis, that assumption is more realistic.
Because of the different assumptions, the resulting incentives cannot be directly compared.13
2.3 Equity Incentives
An alternative way to quantify managerial incentives is to consider the sensitivities of CEO wealth
to the stock price level and stock return volatility, respectively. Equity Delta is the sensitivity of a
taken as given). This in turn affects the number of options at each point in the figure. Naturally, as leverage changes,
one might expect debt volatility to change. In the type of data we are considering in the empirical analysis, leverage
is around 90% on average. In applications where there is a broad range of leverage in the data, using different levels of
debt volatility (for example, from different bond indices) can be important. Qualitatively very similar results obtain
when valuing the stock option as a compound option value and thus keeping the compound value constant as leverage
changes.
12A merit of our analysis is that we can provide a formula for Asset Volatility Vega of stock options. Ab´ınzano and
Navas (2013) instead provide numerical solutions for warrant values, and Anderson and Core compute incentives of
stock options numerically as the difference in the value of options at different asset volatilities.
13Previewing the empirical analysis, there are also other differences. Anderson and Core study non-financial firms,
and because they use post-2006 data, they can also compute incentives from inside debt. We instead focus on financial
institutions in the pre-crisis period; consequently, a limitation of our analysis is that we do not have available the data
needed to compute debt incentives. Moreover, in our regressions, we consistently use asset incentives. Specifically,
we also control for Asset Delta, whereas Anderson and Core present regression results using Equity Delta (which is
correlated, but, as we show, not perfectly correlated with Asset Delta).
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stock or stock option with respect to a one percent change in the company’s underlying stock price.
Equity Volatility Vega is the change in the dollar value of a stock or stock option in response to
a one percentage point change in stock return volatility based on the Black-Scholes option pricing
formula. Following Core and Guay (2002) and most of the existing literature, we assume that the
Equity Volatility Vega from shares of stock equals zero. See Appendix B for details.
2.4 Comparing Asset Incentives and Equity Incentives
Asset incentives depend explicitly on the level of leverage, consistent with the central insight of
Jensen and Meckling (1976) that asset substitution incentives increase with leverage. By contrast,
leverage does not enter explicitly into the formulas determining equity incentives shown in Appendix
B. Thus, Equity Delta for stock is unity, but Asset Delta is less than unity. Conversely, Asset
Volatility Vega is greater than Equity Volatility Vega. For a given firm (at a given leverage),
the latter result is merely a reflection of the fact that equity volatility is determined by asset
volatility, multiplied by the elasticity of the equity value with respect to the asset value (σS =
σV (dS/S)/(dV/V )). This elasticity is greater than one. Importantly, it is a (non-linear) function of
leverage; thus, it varies across firms. In the cross section of firms with varying degrees of leverage
this fact induces a critical difference between asset incentives and equity incentives.
Intuitively, when working with equity incentives, an increase in equity volatility by 0.01 can
come about from different increases of asset risk for each CEO because firms differ in leverage.
(And, because leverage matters non-linearly for asset incentives, controlling for leverage in a linear
regression may not suffice.) Thus, the cross section of incentives to take equity risk yields limited
insight into the cross section of CEO incentives to take asset risk. Considering asset incentives,
instead, “normalizes” the incentive measure in the sense that an increase of asset volatility by 0.01
means the same for each CEO.14 The following two subsections develop this intuition in more detail
and explore its quantitative importance in practice.
14Of course, it may be more difficult for some CEOs to achieve such an increase than for others, but that is not a
matter of incentives, but a matter of cost of effort.
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2.5 Incentives From a Portfolio of Stock and Stock Options
Consider a board that provides a CEO with an equity-based compensation package. The package
should have some given value (say, US$ 5 million, though this value is irrelevant for the analysis
that follows). The total Vegas and Deltas are obtained by multiplying the single stock and single
stock option Vegas and Deltas by the numbers of stocks and stock options conveyed to the CEO.
What are the implied managerial asset substitution incentives of different combinations of stock
and stock options, holding the overall value of the compensation package constant?
To analyze this issue in a condensed fashion, we begin by noting that, everything else equal,
asset risk-taking incentives are higher if Asset Volatility Vega is higher. In addition, a risk-averse
CEO wishes to avoid fluctuations in the asset value, and this desire is more pronounced the more
he participates in any upward or downward movement of firm value. Therefore, asset risk-taking
incentives are lower if Asset Delta is higher.15 CEOs are far less risk-averse than the general
population (Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013). Nonetheless, because Asset Volatility Vega and
Asset Delta typically move together, both effects need to be considered.16 In the spirit of Dittmann,
Yu, and Zhang (2017), we therefore define the Asset Incentive Ratio as the ratio of Asset Volatility
Vega and Asset Delta. This provides a useful summary measure of incentives for our purposes.17
Similarly, the Equity Incentive Ratio is the ratio of Equity Volatility Vega and Equity Delta.
Figure 3 shows three lines each for the Asset and Equity Incentive Ratio, using different levels
of leverage.18 Several properties of the incentive ratios are noteworthy.
15For equity incentives, the prediction is somewhat ambiguous. A higher Equity Delta may also induce more
risk-taking because risk-taking may shift asset risk and can thus make equity holders better off.
16Ross (2004) formally shows that while options have a “convexity effect”, options also increase the sensitivity of
the owner’s wealth to the underlying, which may lead a risk-averse option owner to want to decrease the underlying
risk. Lewellen (2006) quantifies the volatility costs a risk-averse and underdiversified manager experiences, and
shows empirically that executives experiencing higher volatility costs are more conservative in their financing choices
(though she does find that stock option ownership per se is weakly positively related to leverage). The evidence in
Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) also suggests that subjective option values may actually decrease with volatility.
Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Ingersoll (2006), and Carpenter (2000) also argue that a risk-averse and
under-diversified manager may adopt risk-reducing policy choices when compensation exhibits high pay-performance
sensitivity
17An alternative way to incorporate risk aversion would be to directly model expected utility of the agent, but this
would require assumptions regarding executives’ utility functions.
18Equity incentives do not directly depend on leverage. However, as leverage changes, so does the implied equity
volatility, and therefore the number of shares and options conveyed to the CEO also changes to keep the overall value
of the compensation package constant.
14
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
First, the intercept of the Asset Incentive Ratio line is above zero – consistent with the fact that
the asset view allows for risk-taking incentives to emanate also from stock holdings. Naturally, the
intercept is higher for higher leverage.
Second, the Asset Incentive Ratio is larger than the Equity Incentive Ratio. In other words,
asset risk-taking incentives can be large relative to incentives to increase firm value, even when
incentives to take equity risk are dwarfed by incentives to increase the stock price.19
Third, over the whole range of portfolio combinations, as leverage increases, asset substitution
incentives for managers become more pronounced and the difference between the Asset Incentive
Ratio and the Equity Incentive Ratio becomes bigger. (The same is naturally also true for higher
asset volatility; this result is not shown in the graph.) For high leverage, the Asset Incentive Ratio
is easily greater than unity, while this only occurs in extreme cases for the Equity Incentive Ratio.
Fourth, when stock options make up a larger fraction of the portfolio of the CEO, the overall
risk-taking incentives, measured by the two incentive ratios, increase. But the role of stock options
varies between asset incentives and equity incentives. For example, starting at 80% stock and 20%
stock options and going to 20% stock and 80% stock options, the Equity Incentive Ratio goes up by
a factor of three. By contrast, for the same change in the composition of the pay package the Asset
Incentive Ratio only approximately doubles (in the case of leverage of 40% and 55%) or increases
by only about 40% (in the case of leverage of 70%). This result can be explained by recognizing
that when leverage is higher, stock itself already incorporates a significant optionality (reflected
in the higher intercept), so that the extra optionality introduced by the compound option adds
relatively little to the overall asset risk-taking incentives.20
19Of course, the ratios themselves cannot be directly compared as the underlying moving parts differ – asset
values and asset volatility in one case, equity values and equity volatility in the other case. The point is that they
tell quantitatively different stories related to the manager’s incentives to increase the underlying’s value relative to
increase the risk of the underlying.
20One can also verify that, when leverage is higher, the maximum difference between the Asset Incentive Ratio and
the Equity Incentive Ratio occurs at a lower fraction of stock options.
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2.6 The Cross Section of CEO Incentives in Financial Institutions
We have seen that, consistent with intuition, asset substitution incentives of CEOs are likely to
become particularly pronounced at high leverage. We now study a group of firms for which leverage
is a central characteristic: financial institutions. Indeed, understanding incentives of managers in
the financial services industry is of particular interest in the light of recent events.
The sample in which we study this issue includes depository institutions, non-depository credit
institutions, and investment banks and some brokerage firms. We refer to all companies in our
sample as financial institutions.21 We require a company to have compensation data available in
the ExecuComp database. We focus on the years 2003 to 2006 because, as we explain further below,
these years are most likely to contain information regarding the incentives of managers related to
asset risk-taking that became relevant in the crisis. We also require that the company is alive at
the beginning of the third quarter of 2007. Companies which did not have a stock price observation
in CRSP for July 2007 are deemed inactive and excluded from our analysis. However, companies
remaining on this list are allowed to subsequently default, be taken over by or merged with another
company during the crisis period.22
2.6.1 Inputs
Information about executive compensation pay packages is available annually for U.S. entities in
Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database. We focus our analysis on the CEO.23 Consistent with
21The sample choice is motivated by the empirical analysis of asset risk-taking by financial institutions that we
conduct later. Table C-1 in the Supplementary Appendix displays the SIC codes we consider in the analysis. Nagel and
Purnanandam (2015) highlight that for banks, assets embed a short put option on the borrowers’ assets. Thus, assets
themselves are options, which would make equity a compound option (see Peleg-Lazar and Raviv (2017, 2018) for an
analysis of shareholder incentives in this case) and stock options a triple compound option. Our model abstracts from
this additional complication. We focus on asset risk-taking where there is also an upside for the financial institution
taking the risk.
22Some companies were too small to remain in the ExecuComp database for all years 2003 to 2006 but were still
alive going into July 2007. Their compensation information is included into the analysis for the year(s) when they
are covered in the ExecuComp database.
23Murphy (2011) argues that incentives of traders were more important than those of CEOs. Data on below-
management-level compensation structures are not broadly available, unfortunately. For years with missing CEO
information and where the dates at which the CEO assumed office is prior to the particular year, we classify the
executive as the CEO accordingly. If the CEO is not recorded and the necessary information is not accessible from
the SEC Edgar database, we do not include the respective firm in the analysis.
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existing literature, we define the inputs for our calculations as follows: (1) The stock options exercise
prices and (2) maturities are taken from ExecuComp to the extent these are available. If the exercise
price for granted stock options is not available, we assume they were granted at-the-money. To
obtain the stock option maturity for missing grant dates, we follow Guay (1999) and calculate the
maturity of the stock options by assuming that the stock options were granted on July 1 of the year
in which the stock options were granted. (3) We use the fiscal year end closing price of the given
year as the current stock price. (4) The stock return volatility is calculated (from CRSP data) as
the annualized standard deviation of daily log-returns over the past three years by assuming 250
trading days in the year. (5) We use the U.S. Treasury yields obtained from the Fed’s webpage as
proxies for the risk-free interest rate. (6) The annual cash dividend paid by the company over the
fiscal year end closing price is used to calculate the dividend yield. This information is also from
CRSP.
For the asset incentives, we follow Guay (1999) in the calculations of the implied firm value and
other parameters needed for the calculation of incentives. In particular, (7) the firm value (return)
volatility is determined through a portfolio relationship with stock volatility and debt volatility
(see Appendix C for details). For the standard deviation of debt returns, we use the annualized
standard deviation calculated on monthly (log) returns using the Merrill Lynch Bank of America
corporate financial bond index using a five year period.24 As in Guay (1999), (8) the strike price
for equity, seen as an option on firm value, is the book value of debt per share. (9) Guay (1999)
assumes for financial firms that they have a single debt obligation with time to maturity equal
to 7.5 years (as for most financial firms maturity data is unavailable). We use the same baseline
assumption.25 Together with the observation that the stock can be considered as a call option on
24We believe that this index fits our purposes better than the general Merrill Lynch Bank of America corporate
bond index that matches the S&P senior debt rating which Guay (1999) uses. With the index used in Guay (1999),
we obtain stronger results both in terms of the size of risk-taking incentives and the statistical significance in our
risk-taking regressions. Finally, the approach used in Gropp and Heider (2010), just delevering stock return volatility,
yields very similar overall results, too.
25Core deposits (in addition to long-term debt as funding channels in financial institutions) have no explicit maturity
and are often referred to as non-maturity debt. As pointed out by Sheehan (2013) such deposits often remain within
the financial institution for significant periods of time, often longer than 10 years. Thus, 7.5 years is a reasonable
approximation. Note that the debt maturity needs to be longer than the stock option maturity in order for the
compound option approach to apply. In practice, stock option maturities typically range from 3 to 10 years. In
cases where the stock option maturity is longer than 7.5 years, we set the maturity of debt equal to the stock option
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the firm value, one can finally back out (10) an implied firm value per share. Table C-1 shows
descriptive statistics for all the relevant variables.
Delta and Vega for previously granted options (i.e., exercisable and un-exercisable options) and
current year granted options are then multiplied by the amount of options held by the CEO in each
of these dimensions to form the final Vega and Delta quantities.
2.6.2 Asset and Equity Incentives in Financial Institutions
As a benchmark, we begin by analyzing the results for equity incentives. As seen in Table 2, the
average Equity Volatility Vega implies that a one percentage point increase in the company’s stock
price volatility is associated with an increase of around US$301,000 in CEO wealth. This number
is comparable in size with that of other studies on risk-taking incentives in banks. While Equity
Volatility Vega in financial institutions is about double the size of Equity Volatility Vega in the
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) sample of industrial firms, it still seems modest, in particular
compared to Equity Delta. A 1% increase in the company’s stock price results in an increase of
around US$1,131,000 in the CEO’s wealth on average. The Equity Incentive Ratio, defined as the
ratio of Equity Volatility Vega and Equity Delta, is 0.30 on average.
However, it would be wrong to conclude, on the basis of evidence from equity incentives, that
the wealth-driven incentives of CEOs to engage in risky activities, such as investing in sub-prime
products, are small. The Asset Incentive Ratio, that is, the ratio of Asset Volatility Vega to Asset
Delta, equals 0.44 at the median and is, as such, about 50% larger than the Equity Incentive Ratio.
Interestingly, the correlation between the Asset Incentive Ratio with the Equity Incentive Ratio is
only around 0.36. The correlation of Asset Volatility Vega with Equity Volatility Vega is only 0.44
in the overall sample (0.38 to 0.53 across the years). The correlation of Asset Delta and Equity
Delta is substantially higher, around 0.9 overall, but hardly perfect either. This set of results
reflects the fact that, as explained in Subsection 2.4, asset incentives explicitly take into account
maturity plus two years. That is, for a stock option with a 10 year maturity, we effectively assume that the debt
maturity is 12 years. However, consistent with Guay’s (1999) assessment of the sensitivity of his results for Asset
Volatility Vega from stocks to assumptions about debt maturity, we find that for Asset Volatility Vega from options,
the results do not appear sensitive to how we adjust the debt maturity either.
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leverage. Even after controlling for leverage, the partial correlation of Asset Volatility Vega with
Equity Volatility Vega is only 0.43, suggesting that a linear control for leverage while using equity
incentives as an explanatory variable for asset risk-taking is unlikely to produce the same results
as using asset incentives.
Table 2 also shows that, as expected, a large part of asset risk-taking incentives continues
to come from stock options, but it is clear that stock holdings can also imply significant asset
risk-taking incentives. For the median CEO, asset risk-taking incentives due to options are large
compared to those due to stock, but for the mean CEO, (only) about 60% of the total incentives
to increase the asset return volatility are due to options. Table 3 confirms that the results holds
across the years under consideration.
At higher asset volatilities, these effects are even more pronounced. This can be important be-
cause it is often argued that in recessions asset volatilities increase, suggesting particularly powerful
asset risk-taking incentives of managers in bad times, relative to incentives to increase firm value.
For instance, using debt volatilities proposed by Guay (1999) in his analysis (which covers both
financials and industrial firms) yields somewhat higher asset volatilities and, consequently, ratios
of Asset Vega Volatility to Asset Delta that are easily twice or three times as large as the ratios of
Equity Volatility Vega and Equity Delta.
TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
In sum, considering incentives to take asset risk yields a novel picture of managerial risk-
taking incentives and may, therefore, contribute to an enhanced understanding of the relationship
of incentives with risk-taking. We explore this potential in the next section.
3 Incentives, Asset Risk-Taking, and the Financial Crisis of 2007/08
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011) begins its review of incentive com-
pensation practices with the simple statement: “Risk-taking incentives provided by incentive com-
pensation arrangements in the financial services industry were a contributing factor to the financial
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crisis that began in 2007” (p. 1). Even some of those whose pay is being heavily regulated seem
to agree that compensation systems played a role.26 The crisis has sparked numerous calls for
compensation reform; see, for example, Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Spamann (2010).
In this section, we study the relation between incentives of CEOs and asset risk-taking before
the crisis of 2007/08.
3.1 Hypotheses, Empirical Strategy, and Data
It is important to note at the outset that shareholders in principle (ex-ante) welcomed the asset risk-
taking that later turned out to be harmful to the health of their financial institutions. For example,
holding AAA tranches of securitized loans was appealing to shareholders for two reasons. First,
these tranches paid extra yields over and above the typical AAA investments. Second, whether held
on or off the balance sheet, these investments did not require backing by enhanced equity capital.27
Thus, to the extent that there are factors apart from material rewards that make CEOs act in the
interest of shareholders, part of the asset risk-taking in banks, as in other corporations, will not
be explained by direct monetary incentives of CEOs. Functioning alignment of CEO actions with
shareholder interests in financial institutions thus generates a baseline amount of asset risk-taking.28
What we are interested in is whether part of the variation in asset risk-taking beyond this
baseline level can be explained by incentives embedded in the equity and stock option holdings of
managers. Building on the earlier considerations (see Section 2.5), we test three main hypotheses
26For example, in May 2008, PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Economist Intelligence Unit conducted a global
survey of financial services industry executives and commentators. Asked which factors have created the conditions
for the credit/banking crisis, only 31% of survey participants put the blame on “monetary policy,” but an impressive
70% on “reward systems.” See PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008).
27Whether equity is “expensive” is debated hotly. These discussions notwithstanding, it is a fact that most practi-
tioners did believe that holding more equity was not desirable.
28Of course, some ex post realizations also cover simply bad business choices, even those that were not considered
risky ex-ante. For example, the practice of making “Ninja” (no income, no job, no asset) loans on the sheer hope
that real estate prices would continue climbing was arguably ex-ante questionable. But not all risks that were taken
can be labeled as ex-ante bad. Related to this question, there is some discussion as to just how much CEOs suffered
from the crisis. On the one hand, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) show that management teams in the case of
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were able to cash out large amounts of bonus compensation before the crisis. On
the other hand, some evidence suggests that in general CEOs did not take actions they thought would be on average
value-destroying and that they did not, on average, anticipate the crisis. For example, they did not sell their own
shares prior to the crisis, see Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011).
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regarding this relation.
Hypothesis 1: Asset Volatility Vega is positively associated with asset risk-taking.
Hypothesis 2: Asset Delta is negatively associated with asset risk-taking.
Hypothesis 3: The Asset Incentive Ratio is positively associated with asset risk-taking.
We use several empirical strategies to test these hypotheses: We run cross-sectional and panel
regressions with various measures of asset risk-taking as the dependent variables. While write-downs
are analyzed in cross-sectional regressions, other variables afford the opportunity for employing
panel methods, thus also using firm fixed effects.
Risk-taking incentives, governance features, and other firm-specific variables serve as explana-
tory variables.
We first explain the choice of our dependent variables (Subsection 3.1.1). We next describe
the explanatory variables (Subsection 3.1.2). Subsection 3.1.3 then discusses issues related to
endogeneity problems in the relationship between asset risk-taking incentives and asset risk-taking.
An overview of all dependent and explanatory variables is contained in Table 1.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
3.1.1 Dependent Variables
Like other studies (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Guay, 1999; Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu, 2012;
Sanders and Hambrick, 2007), several of our empirical tests rely upon ex-post evidence of asset
risk-taking, though we also consider some contemporaneous measures of risk-taking.
Write-Downs: For our first measure of risk-taking, the idea we appeal to is that for a given
expected project value, a CEO with higher incentives to take risk will be willing to tolerate a
greater spread in potential outcomes. Because the financial crisis exposed the downside of the
investments that banks undertook in prior years, the write-downs form an indication of the degree
of asset risk-taking. Because we aim to capture as broadly as possible the potential downsides, we
focus on write-downs during the period 2007Q3-2008Q4. We collect write-downs data for all U.S.
financial institutions for which they are available and for which we have compensation data.
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For the largest U.S. financial institutions these write-downs are available from Bloomberg, cov-
ering write-downs, losses, and loan-loss provisions. For the smaller U.S. financial institutions for
which Bloomberg does not record write-downs we consult the companies’ proxy filings (10-K and
10-Q). In particular, we identify the following components from the SEC filings in order to be as
consistent as possible with the figures reported by Bloomberg: (1) Write-downs which are explic-
itly referred to as such. They cover charge-offs on loans (conditional on the fact that these are not
included in the loan loss provisions). Furthermore, as a consequence of the financial crisis, some
companies had to abandon certain development projects which led to rising severance charges.
These are typically reported as specific write-downs related to the crisis. (2) Loan loss provisions
are charges or expenses against income and loans which are deemed to be uncollectible due to
the impact of the credit deterioration during the crisis period. (3) Subprime losses appear when
companies directly state that certain losses have occured specifically due to, e.g., investments in the
subprime mortgage backed security market or due to the bankruptcies of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. (4) Impairment charges (or impairment on securities) are non-temporary impairments on
held to maturity and available for sale securities. This is sometimes referred to as losses on trading
securities or impairment on real estate investments. (5) Credit losses which are directly referred to
as such but are not included in the loan loss provisions.
We use both write-downs scaled by total assets to investigate the relative level of asset risk-
taking and the logarithm of write-downs to study the absolute (dollar level) of asset risk-taking
(controlling, of course, for firm size).
Advantages and Disadvantages of Write-downs and Alternative Measures: Write-downs
form a natural proxy for the ex-ante asset risk-taking of financial institutions precisely because
they are not only realized losses, but also unrealized losses. Even if assets that are held to maturity
in the end do not lead to an actual loss, the fact that banks had to take write-downs on them
indicates their ex-ante riskiness. Also, while concrete policy choices can in principle be read from
banks’ financial reports, the discretion banks have in classifying certain assets puts bounds on the
exactness of information obtained from these data.29 Write-downs are a summary variable that
29Moreover, investing in one asset class, for example, MBS securities, may have meant simultaneously shifting out
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captures all these facets in a relatively straightforward way.
Nonetheless, write-downs bring with them some limitations which need to be borne in mind.
First, write-downs are accounting data. They are not always completely clearly and unambiguously
described in company reports.30
Second, and related, firms have discretion of when to announce which write-downs. Also,
in October 2008, the SEC allowed banks to switch from mark-to-market accounting to hold-to-
maturity accounting. We cover a relatively wide data period, but it is still possible that some
write-downs that were announced were not “fair value” losses, or that some losses have not yet been
recorded as write-downs.31 Some studies report that banks use accounting discretion to understate
the impairment of their real estate related assets (Huizinga and Laeven, 2012). Others find the
opposite, namely, that poorly-performing banks overstate unrealized losses (“take a bath”) in order
to show higher earnings the following year (Fiechter and Meyer, 2009). Yvas (2011) documents that
higher corporate governance quality was associated with timelier write-downs in the time period
2007/08. His study takes it as given that the cumulated actual write-downs and those implied by
benchmarking devaluations to credit indices are identical per the end of 2008. What is certain is
that investors demonstrated a particularly keen interest in write-downs during the financial crisis,
which, together with accounting standards (in particular, FAS 157 - Fair Value Measurement which
became effective for annual periods beginning on or after November 15, 2007) requiring detailed
disclosure, is likely to have reduced opportunities for manipulation.
Other Measures: We use a number of other, established measures of risk-taking. We also use
investment in mortgage-backed securities and commercial loans (computed as in Ellul and Yerramilli
(2013)), non-interest income (computed as in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)), and holdings of low-
of another class; also, MBS investments often were acquired by banks in the process of securitization, so that the
choice of banks was, in fact, multi-dimensional.
30Naturally, one can debate in each and every case which parts of the announced overall write-downs should be
included in the analysis, and it can be difficult to precisely disentangle some of the above categories from each other.
We use the sum of all losses associated to the crisis. For a discussion of the challenges and opportunities of accounting
in the financial crisis, see Ryan (2008).
31For example, write-downs may be overestimated because some firms may have been pushed by government
authorities to “come clean.” Conversely, write-downs may be underestimated due to the fact that some financial
institutions were bailed out just for the bailout funds to flow through indirectly to other banks which could otherwise
have ended up in deep trouble.
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quality real estate assets (computed as in van Bekkum (2016)). Table 1 provides details of the data
sources. Finally, we run regressions with the distance from default, as provided by Moody’s, as the
dependent variable. This measure mixes both asset risks and financial risks, and so it is essential
to control for a firm’s financial position (leverage). We do not interpret this measure as capturing
asset risk-taking by management, but use it to analyze whether the market recognizes the riskier
profile of a company with strong risk-taking incentives for its management.
3.1.2 Explanatory Variables
3.1.2.1 Incentives. We use the incentive measures developed above.32 In the write-down re-
gressions, we first present a series of specifications using incentives in 2004 as the explanatory
variable (the MBS market grew particularly strongly after 2004), and then present overview results
with incentives from each year 2003-2006. In the other regressions we use incentives for each year.
3.1.2.2 Company Characteristics. We obtain company-specific information from the Com-
pustat Fundamental and Bank Annual databases. As control variables in the main analysis we
include proxies for firm size (the logarithm of market capitalization), the ratio of the book value of
assets over the market value of assets (as a proxy for the companies potential investment opportu-
nities), and market or book leverage.
3.1.2.3 Corporate Governance Features. We also control for a set of corporate governance
variables. (a) We include log total compensation because Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2015)
argue that abnormally high compensation is related to excessive risk-taking. (Given that we control
for several main determinants of compensation, including total compensation is similar to taking the
residual compensation from a regression of compensation on these determinants.) (b) Percentage
of independent directors is the fraction of directors on a board classified as independent. (c) We
also include CEO age. These data are from ExecuComp and Riskmetrics, supplemented by hand-
32Besides stock and stock options, another determinant of a CEO’s risk-taking incentives is his inside debt, e.g.,
in the form of pension obligations of the firm. Bennett, Gu¨ntay, and Unal (2015), Colonnello, Curatola, and Hoang
(2005), van Bekkum (2016) document the role of this factor in explaining risk-taking choices. In the pre-2006 period,
these data are not widely available.
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collected data where possible. (d) The Governance index is the number of anti-takeover provisions
a company has in place (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). A higher value of the Governance
index is regarded as less shareholder-friendly governance.
3.1.3 Endogeneity Concerns
An association of incentives and risk-taking is subject to endogeneity concerns. We approach this
issue by employing a battery of tests.
First, as for reverse causation, in the write-down regressions we consider the relationship between
incentives (and other variables) in the years 2003-2006 and outcomes over the years 2007-2008. We
do not have information on the decision criteria boards used to allocate incentive packages in a given
year. It is conceivable that incentive packages of a given year include options given as a reward
for undertaking risky deals in earlier years; this would imply an upward bias in the respective
estimates. However, this concern is much less likely to apply to incentives in 2004, for example.
Incentive packages relevant for that year may, of course, include stock and options given as a reward
for other asset risk-taking in prior years, but these potential earlier risky activities do not include
the investments that led to write-downs in the financial crisis. Using these earlier years is also
attractive because the vast majority of deals related to the subprime and mortgage backed security
market originated in the early part of the decade, not in 2006. This is illustrated in Figure 4. While
subprime mortgages have been used for a long time, the “take-off” of the market occurred around
2003 (e.g., Ha¨ssig (2009) for the case of UBS).
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Second, asset substitution incentives of managers explicitly take into account leverage. Our
regressions, therefore, show the relation between incentives and asset risk-taking for a given level
of leverage. One way to interpret this approach is to note that companies are not generally at their
optimal financing points (Leary and Roberts, 2005). However, Shue and Townsend (2017) document
that exogenous variation in option grants induced by multi-year grant cycles causes managers to
increase leverage. An interesting question, therefore, is how incentives to increase leverage depend
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on the interaction between equity grants and existing debt. This joint consideration is beyond the
scope of this paper.33 The endogeneity of leverage may be less of a concern given that we use
market leverage throughout, which fluctuates passively simply because of changes in stock price
performance (Welch, 2004). Our results hold more strongly with book leverage.
Third, we control for important firm-level variables, including several governance features that
may be correlated both with incentives and risk-taking and are likely to capture important differ-
ences between firms. Of course, this still does not rule out the possibility that a positive association
between risk-taking incentives and write-downs could arise because of omitted factors that are
positively correlated with both variables.34 It is equally possible that we are underestimating the
relationship between risk-taking incentives and poor outcomes.35
Fourth, to at least partially address the concern of omitted factors, when using dependent
variables available in a panel, we use firm fixed-effects. This allows us to control for unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity such as fixed differences in risk-taking cultures. While again this
does not completely eliminate endogeneity concerns, these regressions shed light on the relation of
risk-taking incentives and risk-taking in the within-firm dimension.
Fifth, we briefly report on instrumental variables regressions that yield results consistent with
a causal effect of incentives on asset risk-taking.
In sum, none of these tests on its own suffices to fully dispel endogeneity concerns, but collec-
tively they ameliorate these concerns.
33Future work may jointly model the setting of incentives and the choices of the CEO to both increase firm value
return volatility and financial leverage, using an empirical approach as in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). In
principle, not only the level of debt but also the maturity is endogenous (Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010). As
explained earlier, in line with what Guay (1999) does for financial institutions, we use identical debt maturities for
all financial institutions.
34For instance, board competence is unobserved. Some may argue that less competent boards are more easily
captured by the CEO and may, therefore, grant an excessive number of options to CEOs. Moreover, less competent
boards are less able to monitor investments and may provide worse advice to the CEO. These two factors may
combine into a cross-sectional positive relationship between risk-taking incentives and write-downs. Or, the least
talented CEOs (who choose the worst projects on average) may be inclined to self-select into the firms with the
highest risk-taking incentives, to occasionally “hit the jackpot.”
35For example, if a company has a culture of risk-taking, it may attract risk-seeking individuals and may, thus,
need to provide incentives with lower Vega than other firms. At the same time, these companies may, indeed, engage
in a lot of risk-taking simply because the manager likes risk.
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3.2 Regression Results
During the credit crisis period, the companies in our sample had on average write-downs of around
US$7.4bn, which implies write-downs of around 5.8% of their total assets (averaging assets over the
years). See Table 2; monetary values are in 2008 dollars. The heterogeneity in asset risk-taking also
shows in the standard deviation of write-downs and scaled write-downs. Substantial variation also
exists in the other risk-taking measures, such as distance to default and the ratio of interest-income
to total income.
Table 4 presents the regression results for write-downs. Column (1) shows that Asset Vega and
Asset Delta enter significantly and with the predicted sign.36 By contrast, Equity Vega and Equity
Delta are not statistically significantly associated with write-downs in the financial crisis. Note
that this result arises even though we control for leverage. Because leverage matters non-linearly
for asset incentives, merely controlling for leverage while continuing to use equity incentives does
not in general capture variation in asset incentives.
In a next step, we consider the Asset Incentive Ratio (AIR) and the Equity Incentive Ratio
(EIR). As noted in Section 2.5, these quantities can provide useful summary measures of the
incentives. Consistent with columns (1) and (2), respectively, columns (3) and (4) show that AIR
is highly significantly associated with write-downs, while EIR is not. In fact, when one includes both
AIR and EIR, AIR becomes more significant while the coefficient on EIR flips signs (column (5)).
Finally, columns (6) and (7) show that the results are robust to adding further control variables.37
Table 5 explores the time pattern, and it also includes log write-downs in the even-numbered
columns, in addition to the scaled write-downs in the odd-numbered columns. For the AIR, all
8 coefficients go in the expected direction, and 6 are highly statistically significant. By contrast,
only 2 out of 8 coefficients for EIR go in the expected direction, and 2 are statistically significant
but with the wrong sign. In sum, asset incentives outperform equity incentives in explaining the
36The results with opposite signs for Vega and Delta are similar to what Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) find
for corporate hedging activities.
37It is conceivable that taking a ratio of Vega and Delta does worse for equity incentives than for asset incentives.
Therefore, the results for Vega and Delta individually are still relevant. We have also experimented with higher-order
terms for Vega and Delta, but this does not lead to equity incentives significantly explaining write-downs.
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variation in write-downs of US financial institutions in the 2007/08 financial crisis.
One difference between the results for relative asset risk-taking (write-downs scaled by firm
size) and absolute asset risk-taking (log write-downs) is that the regressions for the latter generally
show greater explanatory power than for the former, in terms of R-squared. Indeed, only asset
incentives offer explanatory power for write-downs scaled by assets; by contrast, there is no size
effect in relative asset risk-taking, for example.
TABLES 4 and 5 ABOUT HERE
We find no robust association of any of the governance characteristics with write-downs, control-
ling for incentives to take asset risk; this is illustrated in column (7) of Table 4. That we detect no
significant relationship between director independence and write-downs may be the result of several
countervailing factors. On the one hand, boards acting more strongly on behalf of shareholders may
have pushed CEOs to engage in more asset risk-taking (thus implying a positive relationship).38 On
the other hand, such boards may also have been more prudent in avoiding the worst investments.
Moreover, board independence need not capture competence (Fernandes and Fich, 2016).
Next, we turn to a number of specific measures of risk-taking by financial institutions. Panel
A of Table 6 shows results for Vega and Delta separately for baseline specifications. Together,
these results imply that investments in MBS and commercial loans, investments in low-quality real
estate, and non-interest income activities were more likely to be conducted by financial institutions
where the CEO had pronounced incentives to take asset risk. Equity incentives explain variation
in non-interest income, but do not explain investments in MBS and in low-quality real estate.
These results also hold when using the Incentive Ratios, as seen in columns (1) to (3) of Panel B.
The results are somewhat weaker when including additional firm and governance characteristics as
well as firm fixed effects, in columns (4) to (6). In this most challenging specification, neither of
the two incentives appears to explain within-firm differences in non-interest income activities; asset
38It is also possible that more independent boards forced executives to disclose write-downs earlier or higher. This
argument only holds if one posits that despite the strict accounting regime and the eagerness of investors to monitor
developments at financial institutions, some banks were able to manipulate the total amount of write-downs in the
six quarters considered here.
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incentives are associated with investments in MBS at just below conventional significance, and they
significantly explain investments in low-quality real estate.
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
As a final dependent variable, we consider distance to default (DD), again using panel re-
gressions. Distance to default captures the market’s assessment of the riskiness of the financial
institution. Column (1) of Table 7 shows that Asset Volatility Vega is negatively associated with
DD, while Asset Delta is positively associated with DD. By contrast, the equity incentive measures
do not explain variation in DD; see column (2). Again, this result also holds when combining the
measures into the Asset Incentive Ratio and Equity Incentive Ratio, respectively; see columns (3)
and (4). Importantly, this continues to be the case when including firm fixed effects, from columns
(5) onwards. These results suggest that the market recognized that asset incentives played a role
for the risk position of financial institutions.
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
Finally, we recognize that even the regressions with firm fixed effects do not entirely eliminate
endogeneity concerns. A time-varying risk appetite that causes financial institutions to increase risk-
taking incentives just in the year before they increase risk could still explain the results. Therefore,
we also consider two instrumental variables for incentives. Given the notorious difficulty of finding
suitable instruments and the possibly limited reliability of 2SLS with this small sample size, we view
these results as supplementary checks. (1) Higher historical equity volatility (measured over 5 years
prior to the year when we measure the incentives) is positively correlated with current incentives
because it indicates that it was relatively cheap to grant CEOs stock options. The identifying
assumption that historical volatility does not directly impact asset risk-taking before the crisis and
that the impact is only through its effect on incentives appears plausible. Indeed, studies aiming
to explain risk-taking do not generally use historical volatility as an explanatory variable because
there is little reason to expect a direct effect. (2) Longer CEO tenure is negatively correlated
with current incentives because greater CEO power may mute a board’s ability to implement
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strong incentives. As argued by van Bekkum (2016), there exists considerable ambiguity as to how
personal characteristics, in particular risk aversion, change with age and tenure, so it is far from
clear whether tenure would have a direct effect on risk-taking.39 With these instruments we obtain
results and additional diagnostic statistics, shown in columns (1) to (3) of Table 8, supportive of
a positive impact of the Asset Incentive Ratio on risk-taking.40 Finally, columns (4) to (6) jointly
instrument the Asset Incentive Ratio and the Equity Incentive Ratio, providing further suggestive
evidence of such an impact.
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
Overall, the findings reported in this section broadly provide support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3,
confirming the idea of a link between asset risk-taking and incentives to take asset risk. By contrast,
we do not find a significant relationship between equity incentives and asset risk-taking. Of course,
given that the Asset Incentive Ratio and the Equity Incentive Ratio are correlated, we do find
some relationship between the Equity Incentive Ratio and asset risk-taking, too, but the relation
is overall much weaker. Thus, our analysis documents that, in order to explain asset risk-taking, it
can be important to use asset incentives instead of equity incentives.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper offers one of the first investigations of the quantitative importance of managerial in-
centives to take asset risk. It is motivated by the observation that, while the notion that asset
risk-taking incentives depend on leverage has been a cornerstone of corporate finance since Jensen
and Meckling (1976), the measures of equity incentives typically employed in research do not ex-
plicitly incorporate this idea. The asset incentives we calculate, instead, reflect the intuition that
39Age is also related to risk-taking in the reduced form (thus passing the plausibility check for an instrument that
Angrist (2009) propose (p. 213, point 5)), but performs somewhat worse than tenure in the first stage of the 2SLS
regressions.
40As shown in Table 8, the first-stage F-statistic is, for two out of three cases, above the critical value of 11.59
for two instruments suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002), ameliorating weak instruments concerns. The
Hansen-Sargan J statistic yields a p-value of above 0.1, implying that, conditional on one instrument fulfilling the
exclusion restriction, the other instrument is also likely to be valid. A Hausman test (in the two instruments version)
has a p-value of around 0.1, suggesting that the data do not actually reject the use of OLS in favor of 2SLS (the point
estimates are not very different).
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variation of leverage between companies needs to be taken into account when trying to understand
managerial incentives to take risk. Each incentive measure should be used in the context where it
is appropriate.
We show that the conceptual idea that asset incentives differ from equity incentives is also
relevant quantitatively. We document three main results. First, incentives to take asset risk can be
large compared to incentives to increase the value of assets; this provides a contrast to the fact that
incentives to take equity risk are usually small compared to incentives to increase the stock price.
Second, stock-holdings can also induce substantial asset risk-taking incentives; thus, the proposal,
often heard in practice, to compensate CEOs mostly with stock rather than stock options, in
order to rein in risk-taking incentives does not apply so cleanly anymore. Third, in our empirical
application in the context of the financial crisis, asset incentives possess considerable explanatory
power for asset risk-taking; using equity incentives, one would instead erroneously conclude that
managerial incentives were unrelated to the asset risks that financial institutions took in the years
before the financial crisis 2007/08.
These results may prove helpful for future studies on incentives and risk-taking and may aid
boards and policy-makers in evaluating the incentives conveyed by equity-based compensation.
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Figure 1
Asset Volatility Vega of a single stock option as a function of debt.
This graph plots Asset Volatility Vega of a single stock option for varying levels of the face value of debt, D, computed
using three different approaches: The Geske (1979) approach (dashed line), our analytical result derived in Proposition
1 (“+”) and the difference approximation (solid line). The analytical result and the difference approximation coincide
extremely closely, so one does not see a difference in the figure. See Section 2.2 for details. The parameters are
V = 100, K = 75, r = 0.04, TD = 10, TCC = 6 and σV = 0.10. ∆ = 10
−11 is used to calculate the difference
approximation.
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Figure 2
Asset Volatility Vega as a function of debt.
This graph plots Asset Volatility Vega and Asset Delta of a portfolio of stock options for varying levels of leverage,
D/V , keeping the Black-Scholes value of the overall option package constant at 1000. The stock price is implied by
the Merton (1974) model, and the options are given at-the-money. The remaining parameters are V = 100, r = 0.04,
TD = 10, TCC = 6, σV = 0.10 and σD = 0.04.
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Incentive ratios.
This graph plots the two incentive ratios (IR), the Asset Incentive Ratio (solid lines) and the Equity Incentive
Ratio (dotted lines), for different combinations of stocks and stock options, for a given value of the total equity-
based compensation package. For the Asset Incentive Ratio, sensitivities of stocks and stock options are calculated
according to the model described in Section 2.2, using in particular the Merton (1974) model and the compound
option framework for stock options (Geske, 1979), but using our analytical result for Asset Volatility Vega of a stock
option (see Proposition 1). The parameters for the Asset Incentive Ratio are V = 100, r = 0.04, TD = 10, TCC = 6,
σV = 0.04 and σV = 0.10. For the Equity Incentive Ratio, sensitivities are calculated as described in Section 2.3,
using the Black-Scholes model, also using 6 years as the stock option maturity. The face value of debt is varied to
capture different degrees of leverage. Variation in leverage implies variations in the value of equity according to the
Merton (1974) model. For both incentive ratios, we choose the strike price for the stock options to be equal to the
stock price implied from the Merton (1974) model at each point, i.e., stock options are granted at-the-money. The
stock return volatility is numerically determined through the portfolio relationship described in Appendix C.
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The development in subprime mortgage securitization over the years 1995-2006.
Source: www.subprimer.org.
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Table 1
Variables description.
Dependent variables
Write-downs (USD mill.) The losses incurred by the financial institutions during the
financial crisis period 2007Q3-2008Q4, collected from
Bloomberg, 10-K, and 10-Q filings. For details, see Section 3.1.1
Write-downs scaled by total assets Write-downs divided by a company’s total assets.
Investment in MBS Year-on-year change in the sum of two ratios:
and commercial loans the ratio of commercial and industrial loans (BHDM1766
in the FR Y-9C reports) to assets, as in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013),
plus the ratio of MBS investments to total assets, where MBS
is the sum of the following variables from the FR Y-9C reports:
BHCK1709, BHCK1733, BHCK1713, BHCK1736 and BHCK3536,
as in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)
Low-quality real estate The ratio of nonperforming assets on real estate (NPAORE in Compustat)
relative to total assets, as in van Bekkum (2016)
Non-interest income The ratio of non-interest income to the sum of interest
income and non-interest income, as in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013),
computed from FR-Y-9C reports.
Distance to default Moody’s Distance to Default measure.
CEO compensation
Equity Volatility Vega (1000 USD) The dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 0.01
change in the standard deviation of returns.
Equity Delta (1000 USD) The dollar change in the CEO’s wealth with respect
to a one percent change in the underlying stock price.
Equity Incentive Ratio Equity Volatility Vega divided by Equity Delta
Asset Volatility Vega (1000 USD) The dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 0.01
change in the standard deviation of firm value returns.
Asset Delta (1000 USD) The dollar change in the CEO’s wealth with respect
to a one percent change in the underlying firm value.
Asset Incentive Ratio Asset Volatility Vega divided by Asset Delta
Ln(total compensation) The natural logarithm of CEO total compensation
Firm Characteristics
Market Cap. (USD mill.) The number of shares times end-of-year
stock price plus the book value of liabilities
Total assets (USD mill.) Total assets on the company’s balance sheet.
Book-to-Market ratio Book value of assets over market value of assets.
Book leverage 1 - (book value of equity / book value of assets)
Market leverage 1 - (market value of equity / market value of the financial institution)
Governance
Percentage independent directors (%) The fraction of directors on a board classified as independent.
CEO tenure The number of years the CEO has been in office.
Governance index The number of anti-takeover provisions a company
has in place (Gompers, Ishii, Metrick 2003).
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Table 2
Summary statistics I.
Summary statistics of dependent variables, risk-taking incentives, and selected explanatory variables averaged over the
years 2003-2006. The variables are described in Table 1. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
on an annual basis. The Asset Incentive Ratio and the Equity Incentive Ratio represent Asset Volatility Vega divided
by Asset Delta and Equity Volatility Vega divided by Equity Delta, respectively. For details on parameter choices,
see the text. The term “q” denotes the quantile, i.e., 10q refers to the 10th quantile in the empirical distribution of
the particular variable. All monetary values are expressed in 2008 dollars.
Mean Std. Dev. 10q 25q median 75q 90q
Dependent variables
Write-downs (USD mill.) 7338.7 18253.5 18.0 119.4 552.8 3259.7 23459.7
Write-downs scaled by total assets 0.058 0.082 0.003 0.013 0.030 0.070 0.151
Investment in MBS and comm. loans 0.002 0.026 -0.024 -0.011 -0.001 0.010 0.026
Low-quality real estate 0.041 0.055 0.000 0.004 0.020 0.057 0.099
Non-interest income 0.244 0.145 0.075 0.139 0.222 0.311 0.450
Distance to default 3.163 0.356 2.785 3.016 3.183 3.362 3.630
CEO incentives
Equity Volatility Vega (USD 1000) 251.4 388.8 4.4 19.8 80.7 309.6 786.9
Equity Delta (USD 1000) 1004.1 1577.6 38.7 121.2 443.9 1080.8 2642.9
Equity Incentive Ratio 0.33 0.29 0.02 0.09 0.27 0.50 0.72
Asset Volatility Vega (USD 1000) 3128.8 7180.5 34.1 142.9 712.1 2540.9 8473.4
AVV due to stocks (USD 1000) 1338.9 4741.6 1.5 14.2 89.8 523.6 1944.6
AVV due to options (USD 1000) 1695.8 3146.9 12.5 85.5 400.6 1712.0 4588.2
Asset Delta (USD 1000) 5692.5 11463.6 150.0 487.9 1873.4 5748.0 14402.6
AD due to stocks (USD 1000) 3077.9 9090.7 34.1 173.1 721.0 2246.6 6449.3
AD due to options (USD 1000) 2543.6 4146.2 47.4 182.0 823.2 2814.4 8187.9
Asset Incentive Ratio 0.48 0.32 0.08 0.22 0.45 0.67 0.91
Firm characteristics
Market cap (USD mill.) 13921.8 31143.2 598.8 970.8 2205.9 10402.5 39293.2
Total assets (USD mill.) 100520.7 253011.0 2214.7 4747.4 10885.4 52592.0 255949.9
Book-to-market ratio 0.50 0.19 0.27 0.37 0.49 0.60 0.73
Book leverage 0.89 0.09 0.84 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.94
Market leverage 0.79 0.13 0.70 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.89
Governance
Percentage independent directors 61.9 27.9 0.0 55.6 71.4 80.0 86.7
CEO age 60.4 6.7 52.0 57.0 60.5 65.0 68.0
Governance index 8.5 4.3 0.0 6.0 9.0 12.0 13.0
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Table 3
Summary statistics II
Summary statistics of Asset Volatility Vega (AVV) and Asset Delta (AD) divided into incentives coming from
stock holdings and stock options, respectively, across the years 2003-2006 for all financial institutions in our
sample. The Asset Incentive Ratio (AIR) and the Equity Incentive Ratio (EIR) represent Asset Volatility Vega
divided by Asset Delta and Equity Volatility Vega divided by Equity Delta, respectively, combining stocks and
stock options. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles on an annual basis. The term “q”
denotes the quantile, i.e., 10q refers to the 10th quantile in the empirical distribution of the respective variable.
All monetary values are denominated in USD 1000 and expressed in year 2008 dollars.
Year Incentives Source Mean Std. Dev. 10q 25q Median 75q 90q
2003 AVV due to stocks 1 610.6 4 789.4 7.9 33.3 153.7 697.2 3 300.8
AVV due to options 2 468.1 3 869.4 43.0 196.1 953.2 2 804.4 7 985.5
AD due to stocks 2 830.6 6 286.3 61.1 226.7 769.4 2 148.5 5 864.3
AD due to options 2 929.6 4 017.5 109.0 305.4 1 517.3 3 653.0 8 621.1
AIR both 0.62 0.35 0.20 0.33 0.61 0.88 1.08
EIR both 0.37 0.25 0.05 0.16 0.36 0.52 0.77
2004 AVV due to stocks 2 004.8 6 774.4 7.3 24.4 132.8 685.1 2 561.8
AVV due to options 2 264.1 3 649.8 48.7 180.4 856.2 2 290.9 8 664.4
AD due to stocks 2 957.6 6 356.0 91.5 237.8 848.3 2 468.1 6 682.0
AD due to options 3 128.2 4 579.5 113.2 351.7 1 452.5 3 685.5 8 871.8
AIR both 0.54 0.30 0.14 0.32 0.52 0.74 0.96
EIR both 0.36 0.24 0.05 0.14 0.31 0.57 0.70
2005 AVV due to stocks 1 917.4 6 082.5 5.9 26.8 128.9 977.1 2 228.5
AVV due to options 2 210.2 3 534.5 85.5 184.8 844.7 2 425.5 7 884.4
AD due to stocks 4 290.3 12 241.8 86.3 370.2 834.1 2 411.4 6 297.8
AD due to options 3 386.8 4 658.3 118.0 346.0 1 497.1 3 752.9 10 863.3
AIR both 0.50 0.30 0.12 0.28 0.50 0.66 0.90
EIR both 0.39 0.30 0.04 0.13 0.33 0.59 0.82
2006 AVV due to stocks 1 149.6 3 536.0 2.2 9.2 75.2 428.6 1 938.9
AVV due to options 1 493.3 2 626.3 24.4 77.4 392.1 1 703.3 3 805.2
AD due to stocks 4 161.3 13 191.7 86.6 219.4 792.5 2 497.2 7 519.0
AD due to options 2 924.9 4 731.7 69.2 226.9 965.5 3 208.6 10 398.5
AIR both 0.39 0.29 0.07 0.17 0.37 0.49 0.67
EIR both 0.29 0.24 0.03 0.09 0.23 0.42 0.60
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Supplementary Appendix
Appendix A Asset Volatility Vega From Stock Options
Consider the compound option pricing model described in Section 2.2.1. Our task is to calculate the sensi-
tivity of the compound option pricing formula for a call option with respect to the underlying asset return
volatility. Geske (1979) presents a formula for this derivative, which we denote by “Geske Vega,”
Geske Vega =
∂CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K)
∂σ2V
· dσ
2
V
dσV
=
N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , k + σV
√
TD,
√
TCC/TD)
N1(k + σV
√
TD)
De−rTDϕ(k)
√
TD. (12)
However, we do not rely on this formula for computing the Asset Volatility Vega we use in our analysis. Our
motivation not to employ this formula is that the Black-Scholes model is a special case of the compound
option model when the firm’s debt, D, goes to zero (this observation is also noted by Geske (1979)). Indeed,
in the limit as D → 0, the compound option price converges to the Black-Scholes price. Therefore, we would
also expect that, for zero debt, the Asset Volatility Vega from the compound option model should collapse
into the formula for the Asset Volatility Vega (and, thus, in this special case the Equity Volatility Vega) from
the Black-Scholes model. However, the formula for the Geske Vega suggests, counter-intuitively, that in the
limit when D → 0 the Asset Volatility Vega given by the compound option pricing model would converge to
zero.
In Proposition 1, we derive the correct expression for the vega for a compound call option.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Taking the derivative of a call option in the compound option pricing model
with respect to σV gives us
∂CC
∂σV
= V

∂N2(x, k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h+σV
√
TCC
· d(σV
√
TCC)
dσV
+
∂N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k+σV
√
TD
· d(k + σV
√
TD)
dσV


− De−rTD
∂N2(h, y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k
· dk
dσV
+

V ∂N2(x, k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h+σV
√
TCC
− De−rTD
∂N2(x, k;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h
−Ke−rTCC dN(h)
dh

 dh
dσV
. (13)
In Lemma 1 (see below), we show that the expression in the square bracket of the last term in Equation (13)
equals zero. Moreover, inserting the remaining derivatives used in Lemma 1 into this equation we obtain the
formula
∂CC
∂σV
= V

ϕ(h+ σV√TCC)N1

k + σV
√
TD −
√
TCC
TD
(h+ σV
√
TCC)√
1− TCC
TD

√TCC (14)
+ ϕ(k + σV
√
TD)N1

h+ σV
√
TCC −
√
TCC
TD
(k + σV
√
TD)√
1− TCC
TD

 d(k + σV
√
TD)
dσV


− De−rTDϕ(k)N1

h−
√
TCC
TD
k√
1− TCC
TD

 dk
dσV
,
where
dk
dσV
= − k
σV
−
√
TD and
d(k + σV
√
TD)
dσV
= − k
σV
(15)
and where ϕ denotes the standard normal probability density. Now simplifying terms and using that V ϕ(k+
σV
√
TD) = De
−rTDϕ(k) we obtain Proposition 1. 
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Lemma 1. Given the model assumptions,
Q := V
∂N2(x, k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h+σV
√
TCC
−De−rTD
∂N2(x, k;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h
−Ke−rTCC dN(h)
dh
= 0. (16)
Proof of Lemma 1. By relying on the relation
N2(h, k; ρ) =
∫ h
−∞
ϕ(x)N1
(
k − ρx√
1− ρ2
)
dx (17)
as given in Geske (1979) (pages 79-80) and from the symmetry between k and h, we have the following
relations
∂N2(x, k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h+σV
√
TCC
= ϕ(h+ σV
√
TCC)N1

k + σV
√
TD −
√
TCC
TD
(h+ σV
√
TCC)√
1− TCC
TD


(18)
and
∂N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k+σV
√
TD
= ϕ(k + σV
√
TD)N1

h+ σV
√
TCC −
√
TCC
TD
(k + σV
√
TD)√
1− TCC
TD


(19)
and
∂N2(x, k;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h
= ϕ(h)N1

k −
√
TCC
TD
h√
1− TCC
TD

 (20)
and
∂N2(h, y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k
= ϕ(k)N1

h−
√
TCC
TD
k√
1− TCC
TD

 . (21)
Moreover, we use that V ϕ(h + σV
√
TCC) = V¯ e
−rTCCϕ(h) where V¯ is the solution to Equation (5). This
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gives us
Q = V¯ e−rTCCϕ(h)N1

k + σV
√
TD −
√
TCC
TD
(h+ σV
√
TCC)√
1− TCC
TD

 − De−rTDϕ(h)N1

k −
√
TCC
TD
h√
1− TCC
TD


− Ke−rTCCϕ(h). (22)
Simplifying terms inside the standard normal distribution functions, we can write Equation (22) as follows
Q = e−rTCCϕ(h)
[
V¯ N1(k¯(V¯ ) + σV
√
TD − TCC)−De−r(TD−TCC)N1(k¯(V¯ ))−K
]
. (23)
By again relying on Equation (5) and on the definition of V¯ , we know that the term in square brackets is
zero. Thus, our result is obtained. 
Remarks to the proof of Proposition 1.
In some cases, researchers may be interested in analyzing how the firm value where the option is precisely
at the money, V¯ , varies as the asset volatility varies. That is, we would wish to compute the term dV
dσV
.
Although the term dh
dσV
, in which V¯ features, plays no role in the proof of Proposition 1 (the terms in front
of it cancel out), we present the derivations for computing this derivative here for completeness.
Define the following function
f(x, y) = xN1(k(x, y) + y
√
TD − TCC)−De−r(TD−TCC)N1(k(x, y))−K, (24)
where
k˜(x, y) =
log( x
D
) + (r − y22 )(TD − TCC)
y
√
TD − TCC
. (25)
Now, by relying on Equation (24) above we have that
f(V , σV ) = 0. (26)
Since the function f depends on σV both through the direct effect but also indirectly through its effect on
V¯ , we can consider the function f as a function in these two variables. Writing up the dynamics using the
chain-rule, we have
df(V , σV ) =
∂f
∂x
(V , σV )dV +
∂f
∂y
(V , σV )dσV = 0, (27)
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which equivalently can be written as
dV
dσV
= −
∂f
∂y
(V , σV )
∂f
∂x
(V , σV )
. (28)
We obtain
dV
dσV
= −De
−r(TD−TCC)ϕ(k)
√
TD − TCC
N1(k + σV
√
TD − TCC)
, (29)
where
k = k˜(V , σV ). (30)
Now it is straightforward to compute the term dh
dσV
in Equation (13). From,
h =
log(V
V
) + (r − σ2V2 )TCC
σV
√
TCC
(31)
we obtain
dh
dσV
=
1
V
√
TCC
De−r(TD−TCC )ϕ(k)
√
TD−TCC
N1(k+σV
√
TD−TCC)
− h
σV
−
√
TCC (32)

We rely on the formula in Proposition 1 to measure the CEO asset risk-taking incentives we apply in
the analysis. Analogously to the Asset Volatility Vega from stocks we divide the expression in Proposition 1
by 100 so that it measures the sensitivity of the option price with respect to a 0.01 change in the underlying
asset return volatility, as we did it with the Equity Volatility Vega.
To confirm the intuitive benchmark result mentioned above, consider the case when the debt, D, tends
to zero. Then, since V¯ tends to the strike K and k tends to +∞ it is clear that
lim
D→0
∂CC
∂σV
= V ϕ(h+ σV
√
TCC)
√
TCC (33)
which is precisely the vega of a call option in the Black-Scholes model and where h is given in Equation (31).
Figure A-1 shows a comparison of the formulas for the Asset Volatility Vega given by the formula in
Geske (1979) (see Equation (12)) with our Asset Volatility Vega (see Proposition 1) and the one computed
by the first difference approximation for parameter values relevant for the analysis conducted in this paper
and for varying levels of asset volatilities, σV .
We make two observations. First, as before, the analytical formula in given in Proposition 1 completely
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Figure A-1
Comparison of Asset volatility Vega to Geske’s formula.
Comparison of Asset Volatility Vegas for varying asset volatility, σV , computed using three different approaches: The
Geske approach (dotted line), our approach (“+”) and the difference approximation (solid line). The parameters
are V = 100, K = 50, r = 0.04, TD = 10, TCC = 6 and D = 85. ∆ = 10
−11 is used to calculate the difference
approximation.
agrees with the first difference approximation. Second, there are substantial differences between the Asset
Volatility Vega computed using the formula in Proposition 1 and the formula presented in Geske (1979)
at common levels of the asset volatility. The difference (both in absolute and in relative terms) between
the two approaches to compute the Asset Volatility Vega is particularly pronounced for moderate and low
levels of asset volatility, which is commonly observed for financial institutions, though it remains substantial
even at higher levels of asset volatility. That is, if we were to use the formula in Geske (1979), we would
substantially underestimate the incentives to take asset risk as compared to our formula (and the difference
approximation).
Appendix B Equity Delta and Equity Volatility Vega
Following Core and Guay (2002), we calculate Equity Delta and Equity Volatility Vega using the derivatives
of the Black-Scholes formula (see Black and Scholes (1973)) with respect to the underlying stock and the
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stock return volatility respectively. We assume that the stock price, S, follows a geometric Brownian motion
dSt
St
= µSdt+ σSdWt (34)
under the historical measure. The parameters µS and σS are assumed constant and we also assume that
there exists a bank account which yields a constant interest rate r. Recall that the value of a plain vanilla
call is given by
BS = Se−δTN(d1)−Ke−rTN(d2) (35)
with
d1(S,K, r, T, σS) =
ln(S/K) + ((r − δ) + σ2S/2)T
σS
√
T
(36)
d2(S,K, r, T, σS) = d1(S,K, r, T, σS)− σS
√
T , (37)
where N denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. S denotes the
stock, K denotes the strike, σS is the return volatility, r represent the risk-free rate, δ denotes the dividend
yield and T represents the maturity of the option. T corresponds to TCC in the Compound option pricing
framework.
The Equity Delta of a single option can be computed according to
Equity Delta =
∂BS
∂S
· (S/100) = e−δTN(d1) · (S/100), (38)
which measures the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a one percent change in the stock price.
The Equity Volatility Vega of a single option can be computed according to
Equity Volatility Vega =
∂BS
∂σS
· (1/100) = e−δTϕ(d1)S
√
T · (1/100) (39)
which measures the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in the underlying stock
return volatility and ϕ denotes the density of a standard normal random variable.
As is standard in the literature, we assume that Equity Delta from stocks is equal to one (by construction)
and that Equity Volatility Vega from stocks equals zero; see Guay (1999).
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Appendix C Sample and Parameter Choices
Table C-1 shows the SIC codes we consider in the analysis. As described in the main text, we mostly follow
Guay (1999) in our parameter choices. Table C-1 shows descriptive statistics for all the relevant variables.
To obtain an estimate of the firm value return volatility, σV , Guay (1999) proposes to rely on portfolio
theory. Thus, the variance of the firm value can written as
σ2V = X
2
debtσ
2
debt +X
2
equityσ
2
equity + 2XdebtXequityCov(σdebt, σequity), (40)
where Xdebt and Xequity are the weights of debt and equity in the firm’s capital structure and σequity ≡ σS
is the annualized standard deviation of daily log stock returns. We use the same σequity as we have used for
computing Equity Volatility Vega and Equity Delta. For σdebt, we use the annualized standard deviation of
monthly (log) returns using the Merrill Lynch Bank of America corporate financial bond index using a five
year period. Moreover, we follow Guay (1999) and set the correlation between equity and debt returns equal
to one, Corr(σdebt, σequity) =
Cov(σdebt,σequity)√
σ2debtσ
2
equity
= 1, which implies that Cov(σdebt, σequity) = σdebtσequity and,
therefore,
σ2V = X
2
debtσ
2
debt +X
2
equityσ
2
equity + 2XdebtXequityσdebtσequity. (41)
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Table C-1
Industry classification.
SIC code 6211 includes some well-known investment banks and some brokers. In general, where we have data on
risk-taking measures we keep these brokerage firms in the sample but exclude those brokers listed in the same SIC
code as exchanges, SIC code 6200. While engagement in the subprime mortgage business may not have been at the
core of the business strategy of those brokers in the SIC 6211 code, these companies nonetheless often did engage in
such activities. Our write-down regression results (Table 4 hold also if we exclude all SIC 6211 firms, but this then
also excludes firms such as Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, clearly an undesirable
sample restriction. We do not consider investment advisors (SIC code 6282). For other finance SIC codes that are
not shown we do not have companies with compensation data. For some dependent variables (non-interest income,
investments in MBS and commercial loans) only bank-holding companies reporting to the Federal reserve (SIC codes
6020, 6035, 6036) are included in the sample.
Financial institutions 2-digit SIC SIC Code Financial Service Industry
Depository Institutions 60 6020 Commercial Banks
6035 Federal Savings Institutions
6036 Savings Institutions, Except Federal
6099 Functions Related to Depository Banking
Nondepository Credit 61 6111 Federal Credit Agencies
Institutions 6141 Personal Credit Institutions
6159 Miscellaneous Business Credit
6162 Mortgage Bankers and Loan Correspondents
6172 Finance Lessors
6199 Finance Services
Security Brokers and Dealers 62 6211 Security Brokers and Dealers
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Table C-1
Estimated parameters for the Compound option pricing model
Descriptive statistics of the parameters used in the computations of Asset Volatility Vega and Asset Delta. The
summary statistics are average over the years 2003-2006. Per-share stock price denotes the average end-of-year stock
price. Per-share book-value of debt denotes the book value of liabilities end-of-year. The risk-free interest rate is the
yield on U.S. Treasury bonds with a maturity similar to maturity of the firms liabilities. Standard deviation of debt
returns is the annualized standard deviation calculated on monthly (log) returns using the Merrill Lynch Bank of
America corporate financial bond index using a five year period. Standard deviation of equity returns is calculated
(from CRSP data) as the annualized standard deviation of daily log-returns over the past three years up to each year
in our sample by assuming 250 trading days in the year. Est. std. dev. of returns on firm value denotes the estimated
standard deviation of returns on the firm value. Weight of equity and Weight of debt are, respectively, the shares
of equity and debt in the firm’s capital structure. Implied per-share market value of assets is backed out using the
Black-Scholes equation. Per-share market value of assets denotes sum of the per share end-of-year stock price and
the per share book value of debt. Price-to-strike ratio is the implied per share firm value divided by the per share
book value of debt. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles on an annual basis. The term “q”
denotes the quantile, i.e., 10q refers to the 10th percentile in the empirical distribution of the respective variable. All
monetary values are expressed in 2008 dollars.
Firm characteristics Mean Std. Dev. 10q 25q 50q 75q 90q
Per-share stock price ($) 42.0 22.7 17.9 25.6 37.3 52.8 69.6
Per-share book-value of debt ($) 238.3 254.3 61.2 103.9 160.4 282.4 409.7
Risk-free interest rate (%) 4.1 0.4 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.6
Standard deviation of debt returns (%) 3.1 0.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.2
Standard deviation of equity returns (%) 27.5 9.5 17.3 21.3 25.8 32.0 37.8
Est. std. dev. of returns on firm value (%) 5.7 2.8 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.9 7.1
Weight of equity (%) 10.4 6.9 5.6 7.4 9.0 10.5 14.3
Weight of debt (%) 89.4 7.9 85.6 89.4 91.0 92.6 94.4
Imp. per-share market value of assets ($) 215.6 200.4 67.1 108.1 156.9 256.0 373.3
Per-share market value of assets ($) 280.0 270.4 85.2 134.2 201.4 333.4 476.3
Price-to-strike ratio 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
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